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NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING 
COMMERCIAL AND FEDERAL LITIGATION SECTION 
STATE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF NEW YORK 
MARRIOTT MARQUIS HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY 
THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1991 
6:00 P.M. 
"Federal Habeas Review of New York Convictions: 
Relieving The Tensions" 
Good afternoon and welcome to our program, "Federal Habeas 
Review of New York Convictions: Relieving the Tensions." Before 
you are the members of the State/Federal Judicial Council of New 
York. They will constitute the panel for this program. I 
introduce them to you now. [from left to right] -- Justice 
Theodore R. Kupferman of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, First Department; Justice Edwin Kassoff, Presiding 
Justice of Appellate Term, New York Supreme Court, Second and 
Eleventh Judicial Districts; and Judge Charles P. Sifton of the 
United States District Court, Eastern District of New York. 
Judge Fritz W. Alexander, II of the New York Court of Appeals who 
was scheduled to be on the program, has the flu and cannot 
attend. I am Judge Roger J. Miner of the United states Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Chairman of the State/Federal 
Judicial Council of New York, and Moderator of this forum. We 
are grateful to the New York State Bar Association and its 
Section on Commercial and Federal Litigation for co-sponsoring 
this symposium as part of the annual meeting of the New York 
State Bar Association. 
First, a word about the State/Federal Judicial Council of 
New York. The Council exists to promote and harmonize the 
relationship between state and federal courts in New York and to 
minimize any conflicts that may develop from the operation of the 
dual system of courts in this state. We seek to maintain a 
continuous dialogue on all joint problems in order to improve and 
expedite the administration of justice by the state and federal 
courts. Among other accomplishments, our Council has handled the 
scheduling conflicts of attorneys practicing in both systems, 
arranged for the sharing of court facilities, and participated in 
the establishment of the mechanism now in place for certifying to 
the New York Court of Appeals questions of state law presented to 
federal courts. We have sponsored joint programs for the 
exchange of views on such matters of mutual interest as the 
individual assignment system, jury selection, attorney sanctions 
and criminal sentencing. 
Our program tonight deals with a subject that has been a 
constant source of friction over the years between state and 
federal courts -- the review of New York criminal convictions in 
habeas corpus proceedings brought in federal courts. Many 
members of the New York judiciary think that the dual court 
system goes awry when a single federal district judge orders the 
release or retrial of an incarcerated defendant whose case has 
been reviewed and considered by as many as 13 state judges. The 
statistics demonstrate, however, that the granting of such relief 
is a rare event. First of all, filings of federal habeas 
challenges to state court convictions do not constitute a 
significant part of the national federal caseload. Of the 
233,529 district court filings for the 12 month period ended June 
30, 1989, only 10,554 represented habeas challenges to state 
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court convictions. This is less than 5% of the national filings 
in federal district courts. For the same period, there were 
16,974 civil cases filed in the New York federal district courts, 
and 677, or about 4% of these, were habeas challenges to New York 
convictions. During the last five years, district court filings 
of habeas challenges to New York convictions have been fairly 
level, ranging from a low of 663 to a high of 758. The last 
time-study of the federal court system revealed that the total 
number of judicial hours devoted to state habeas petitions in the 
district courts in the entire nation averaged 1.3% of all 
judicial time. While there were several hundred different 
categories of suits in the time-study, habeas cases obviously do 
not represent a major share of federal judicial time. 
The reported decisions of the New York federal district 
courts show four petitions granted in 1990, six each in the years 
1988 and 1989, seven in 1987 and three in 1986. Among the 
reported decisions issued by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
in 1990, there were only 11 state habeas cases. District court 
judgments were affirmed in eight of the cases, reversed with 
directions for entry of judgment for petitioner in one case and 
remanded for further proceedings in two cases. In 1989, seven 
judgments were affirmed in the Second Circuit and five were 
remanded for further proceedings. Habeas cases have even less of 
an impact on appellate caseloads than they do on district court 
caseloads. It is estimated that state court judgments of 
conviction are disturbed in only ~% to 1% of all habeas cases 
filed nationwide in any given year. 
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Despite the fact that there are comparatively few habeas 
cases in the federal system and even fewer grants of relief, the 
tension remains. Some recent decisions seem to have exacerbated 
the tension. No less a figure than our own Justice Kupferman, 
dissenting in a 1990 decision in his court, People v. Kin-Kan, 
wrote: 
It is unseemly for seven Judges of the New York 
State Court system, without a dissent, to be overruled 
by one Judge in the federal system simply because of a 
different subjective view of the applicable 
constitutional principle and the balancing of the 
defendant's right to a public trial versus the danger 
to a witness. 
The majority in Kin-Kan decided that the defendant was 
entitled to the benefit of a district court determination, made 
in the case of a co-defendant, that the sixth amendment right to 
a public trial had been violated by the closure of the courtroom 
during accomplice testimony. The defendant and the co-defendant 
had been tried together, and the habeas grant to the co-defendant 
had been affirmed in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
majority wrote: 
It is no longer open to us to accept the People's 
invitation to find error in Judge Sand's conclusion 
that the state court proceeding at the same trial fell 
below federal constitutional standards. As properly 
asserted by defendant Kin, those arguments would lie 
only by way of reargument before the Second Circuit or 
by application for certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Perhaps our colleague will tell us a little more about that case 
when his time to speak comes. I was particularly offended by 
that part of his dissent in which he noted that a different panel 
of the Second Circuit may have come to a different conclusion. 
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As authority for that dubious proposition, he cited two copyright 
opinions, one of which was written by me. 
Federal law requires substantial deference to state courts 
in criminal matters. State remedies must be exhausted before a 
federal habeas petition will be considered. State court factual 
findings are presumed to be correct. The Stone v. Powell Rule 
denies any challenge on fourth amendment grounds when the state 
has provided the opportunity for a full and fair litigation of 
the fourth amendment claim. As one commentator has written of 
federal habeas, "the courts are fond of extolling its virtues at 
length before denying relief. 11 Nevertheless, the tension 
continues between state and federal courts in this area. We hope 
that our discussion this afternoon will help to relieve the 
tension between judiciaries. That is our purpose. We intend, as 
part of our discussion, to review some of the recent cases in 
which challenges to New York convictions were sustained and the 
writ allowed. Our program includes a large block of time for 
questions and comments from the judges and the panel and the 
lawyers in the audience. According to our format, each judge on 
the panel will make a 10 minute presentation. Following that, I 
will open the floor to questions and comments but will ask that 
they be directed through me. 
I start the discussion by making some observations on some 
recent cases in which habeas challenges were sustained. Between 
1988 and 1990, federal constitutional challenges to state court 
convictions in New York were sustained on a variety of grounds. 
In Harper v. Kelly, the trial court was found to have violated 
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the sixth amendment right to confrontation by curtailing cross-
examination regarding the emotional state of the victim. The 
federal court held that the petitioner's ability to probe the 
reliability of the victim as eye witness had been denied. In 
Reddy v. Coombe, the statements of the defendants were found not 
to fall within the old interlocking confession exception to the 
Bruton rule. In Fullan v. Commissioner, the federal court dealt 
with the denial of a free trial transcript for appeal, holding 
that the free transcript must be provided despite the fact that 
the petitioner was represented by an attorney hired by family and 
friends. 
In Innes v. Dalsheim, the federal court determined that the 
trial judge had not made it clear in the plea hearing that the 
plea could not be withdrawn. The conclusion was that there was 
no intelligent and knowing waiver of constitutional rights with 
full knowledge of the consequences. A violation of due process 
was found in Sanders v. Sullivan. The circuit court there held 
that such a violation occurs when a credible recantation of the 
testimony in question would probably change the outcome of the 
trial but the state nevertheless leaves the conviction in place. 
The circuit court remanded to determine the credibility of the 
victim's recantation. 
The circuit court also remanded for an evidentiary hearing 
in the case of Escalera v. Coombe. In this case the petitioner's 
brother had not been allowed to testify because he was not on the 
list of alibi witnesses as required by the New York statute. The 
circuit court held that if the attorney had not acted willfully 
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in excluding the brother's name from the list, habeas should be 
granted. In Rosario v. Kulhman, the trial court's refusal to 
allow the transcript of impeaching testimony from a co-
defendant's trial was held to be constitutional error where it 
was found that all possible efforts had been made to locate the 
impeaching witness. 
More than any other type of case, cases involving delay in 
the state court system form the basis for successful habeas 
challenges in New York. In Elcock v. Henderson, the petitioner 
was convicted of murder and assault in 1978. He filed a notice 
of appeal shortly after his conviction, but his appeal was not 
decided in the Appellate Division until 1987. The Second Circuit 
returned the case to the district court for findings on the issue 
of a due process claim for unconscionable delay. Exhaustion of 
state remedies was not required in view of the nine year period 
of delay. In Brooks v. Jones, there was an eight year delay in 
prosecution of the appeal due to inexcusable neglect on the part 
of a series of assigned counsel. In Mathis v. Hood, a delay of 
six years in perfecting the appeal as the result of the neglect 
of counsel was characterized by the Second Circuit as "shocking" 
as well as not unusual in the First and Second Departments. On 
remand, the district court directed that the prisoner be released 
pending a new appeal. 
I close my overview of cases in which habeas was granted 
with an opinion I wrote in 1988. The case is Jenkins v. Coombe. 
The attorney originally assigned to represent the petitioner in 
his state appeal was relieved because of a conflict of interest 
7 
arising from his representation of a co-defendant. The court 
appointed another attorney to represent petitioner on appeal and 
that attorney moved to be relieved within six months of his 
appointment. The motion was denied, and the attorney thereafter 
filed a clearly inadequate five page brief containing but one 
point. That point consisted of three paragraphs attacking the 
identification testimony. Petitioner then lodged a complaint 
against the attorney, who then unsuccessfully moved to be 
relieved. The application was granted, but the Appellate 
Division failed to provide substitute counsel. 
Petitioner then filed a 51 page supplemental pro se brief 
advancing the same three arguments that had been successful for 
his co-defendant, together with three arguments of his own. The 
Appellate Division took the case under advisement and determined 
that the points which the co-defendant was successful on did not 
apply to petitioner. In the habeas case, the district court 
wrote that petitioner had the benefit of effective assistance of 
counsel, even though it was not his own counsel. On appeal, I 
wrote that the petitioner was not provided with effective 
appellate counsel and that he really had no counsel or, at best, 
nominal counsel to represent him on appeal. 
It seems to me that much of our tension can be relieved by 
the assignment in state courts of competent counsel who can 
perfect appeals in a timely manner. 
One final note. In Harris v. Reed, decided in 1989, the 
Supreme Court determined that a procedural default in a state 
court will not bar consideration of a federal substantive claim 
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on habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment 
in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests 
on the state procedural bar. To get past a state procedural bar 
in a habeas case, the petitioner must of course show cause for 
the procedural default as well as prejudice flowing from the 
alleged constitutional violation. The cause requirement may be 
dispensed with in the case of a strong showing of probable :~~~ 
factual innocence. The Harris decision overrules Second Circuit 
precedent that silence in the state court in the face of both 
substantive and procedural claims would be taken to mean that the 
state court relied on the procedural bar. It is now especially 
important for the Appellate Division to indicate the basis for a 
decision in criminal appeals. Affirmance with no opinion just 
contributes to the tension. In any event, perhaps habeas corpus 
challenges to state court convictions should be restricted to 
claims that go to the reliability of the guilt-determining 
process and, just perhaps, only prisoners who urge that their 
guilt was not properly established should be entitled to the 
writ. 
I call upon Justice Kupferman for his remarks. 
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